Re-framing the Alien Tort Act after Kadic v. Karadxic by Marshall, Charles F.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 21 | Number 3 Article 3
Summer 1996
Re-framing the Alien Tort Act after Kadic v.
Karadxic
Charles F. Marshall
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles F. Marshall, Re-framing the Alien Tort Act after Kadic v. Karadxic, 21 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 591 (1995).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol21/iss3/3
Re-framing the Alien Tort Act after Kadic v. Karadxic
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This article is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol21/iss3/3
Re-framing the Alien Tort Act After Kadic v. Karadzic
I. Introduction
As international human rights have moved to the forefront of
international law, the role of the federal judiciary in asserting
jurisdiction over such claims has become increasingly important.'
When federal courts probe the activities of foreign countries and
attempt to hold their leaders accountable, United States foreign policy
is directly implicated.2 In light of these situations, courts should have
express authority from Congress.
For 200 years, that authority has been the Alien Tort Act,' though
federal courts have yet to consistently define its scope. With no
additional clarification from either Congress or the Supreme Court,
federal courts have had the challenge of interpreting the Alien Tort
Act in the context of modern international law.4 Since 1980, the
courts have used the Alien Tort Act to assert their right to hear claims
arising out of the basements of Paraguay5 and the torture chambers
of the Philippines.6
Just recently, the Second Circuit used the Alien Tort Act to assert
jurisdiction over the events pertaining to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.7
The alleged acts of genocide and war crimes are reminiscent of the
Nazi death camps during World War Two.' The Second Circuit held
that a district court in Manhattan had subject-matter jurisdiction over
Radovan Karadzic, alleged author of these atrocities.9 The court ruled
that Karadzic could be held liable for acts of war crimes and genocide
even if he was not considered a "state actor" when he committed such
acts."° The decision to extend liability for these violations broadened
the scope of the Alien Tort Act, the revival of a cause that had been
spearheaded over a decade and a half ago by the Second Circuit in
I Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Jefferey M. Blum & Ralph G.
Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act
after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 53 (1981); William R. Castro, Federal Courts
Protective Juisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467
(1986).
2 Castro, supra note 1, at 484.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). For purposes of simplicity and consistency within this Note,
I will refer to this statute simply as the "Alien Tort Act" or "§ 1350."
4 See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5 Id.
6 See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.
1992).
7 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), reh k denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996).
8 See infra note 25.
9 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238-46.
10 Id. at 244-45.
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Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. "
This Note will begin by exploring the facts and procedural history
of the Kadic and Doe cases in Part 11.12 Part III will explore the
historical origins of the Alien Tort Act and examine its recent
evolution in the federal courts."5 Part III will also examine the
historical role of non-state actor liability under the law of nations.'4
Part IV provides an analysis of the Kadic cases and centers on two
important questions. 5 The first is whether non-state actors may be
held liable for war crimes and genocide under the law of nations.1 6
The second is whether the Alien Tort Act is the proper vehicle for a
federal court to assert jurisdiction over claims which occur outside the
United States and do not involve United States citizens. '7 Finally, this
Note will briefly address a more pressing concern-how the practical
complexities of such jurisdiction might threaten the integrity of United
States courts throughout the world.'"
H. Statement of the Case
A. Background of Events
The atrocities alleged by the plaintiffs in the Kadic cases arise out
of the hostilities that have plagued the former Yugoslavia since 1991.
On March 3, 1992, the Croats and Muslims in that area proclaimed
their independence as Bosnia-Herzegovina by a popular referen-
dum.' 9 Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum and formed a self-
proclaimed Serbian "state" within Bosnian territory.2 ° On April 6, war
broke out between the Bosnian government and the rebel Serbs, just
when the European Union recognized Bosnia's independence.2 ' The
war pitted the several ethnic factions against one another and escalated
into a full-blown civil war, capturing the attention of the world.
Radovan Karadzic was an influential political and military leader
of the rebel Serb state known as "Srpska," which "exercises actual
control over large parts of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "22 He
headed a tripartite presidency of Srpska and was also the military
11 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
12 See infra notes 19-65 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 66-135 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 136-60 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 161-239 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 164-204 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 205-32 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 232-39 and accompanying text.
19 A LongRoad to Peace, WASH. POST, Nov. 22,1995, at A22. Other chronologies point
to February 29, 1992 as the date that Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence. See, e.g.,
Chronology of Bosnia War, N.Y. TIMES, February 6, 1994, at A12.
20 A Long Road to Peace, supra note 19, at A22.
21 Id.
22 Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995).
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leader of the warring Serbian forces, who allegedly caused many of the
internationally-recognized atrocities.23
In 1993, as the war intensified, two groups of similarly situated
plaintiffs filed class action suits against Karadzic in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in Manhattan.2 4
The plaintiffs alleged that Karadzic committed numerous human rights
violations against them as President of Srpska and as commander of
the Serbian rebel forces.25  Specifically, they alleged that they were
the victims of a genocidal campaign waged by Serbian forces under
Karadzic's direction.2 6  The plaintiffs sought compensatory and
punitive damages as well as attorneys' fees and injunctive relief.2
Service of process proved difficult for the plaintiffs, but they finally
served Karadzic while he was in New York as an invitee of the United
Nations, accompanied by a Special Agent of the Diplomatic Security
Service of the United Nations.28
B. The District Court's Opinion
On September 7, 1994, United States District Court Judge Peter
K. Leisure dismissed the lawsuits for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. 9 Plaintiffs had sought subject matter jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Act,3 ° an antiquated alienage jurisdiction statute which was
originally promulgated in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary Act.3
23 Id.
24 Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 735-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
25 Id. The two lawsuits began separately. The first class of plaintiffs, the "Doe"
plaintiffs, filed their complaint on February 11, 1993, alleging rape, torture, and summary
execution. The class covered thousands of plaintiffs who were allegedly subjected to
systematic forms of "ethnic cleansing." Id. The Doe complaint was the product of Yale Law
School's Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic. It was briefed by Yale Law
School professor Harold Hongju Ko and Ronald C. Slye (who are the clinic's directors) and
11 students. Thomas Scheffey, No Place to Hide, CONN. L. TIUB., November 6, 1995, at 1.
The second class action was filed by S. Kadic. It alleged similar human rights violations such
as massacres, forced detention and pillage, and Kadic alleges that she was, in fact, raped.
Kadic, at 736-37. Feminist legal theorist Catharine A. MacKinnon, of the University of
Michigan School of Law, brought the Kadic action and was aided by the National
Organization for Women. Scheffey, supra at 1.
26 Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 735-36.
27 Kadic, 70 F,3d at 237. Only the Kadic case sought injunctive relief against continued
war crimes.
28 Id. Though Karadzic admits that he was served, there was genuine concern for
whether service was proper in either case. Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 737. In the Doe case, there
were conflicting affidavits as to whether the agent of the court had gotten close enough to
Karadzic to deliver the papers, but it is undisputed that the agent exclaimed, "You have been
served," as he attempted the delivery. Id. at 737-38. In the Kadic case, the court granted a
motion for service through alternate means, as Karadzic was deemed served when a U.S.
Marshal presented a copy of the summons and complaint to Special Agent Diebler, a member
of State Department's security detail assigned to Karadzic. Id.
2 Doe, 866 F.Supp. at 734.
30 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
31 Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (28 U.S.C. § 1350).
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They also sought relief under the Torture Victim Protection Act
32(TVPA) and the federal question statute.
Judge Leisure held that jurisdiction was improper under the Alien
Tort Act because Karadzic was a private actor, and that the law of
nations"3 does not impose duties on private persons or "non-state
actors." 4 Judge Leisure based his decision largely on Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,35 which held that torture is a violation of the law of nations
when committed by public officials.36 He found additional support
in later cases, most explicitly in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,37
where the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an
action brought against the Palestine Liberation Organization by
survivors of a PLO terrorist attack.38 Thus, Judge Leisure concluded
that, "the acts alleged in the instant action, while grossly repugnant,
cannot be remedied through 28 U.S.C. § 1350.""9 Judge Edwards,
writing one of three concurring opinions,4 ° argued that extending
jurisdiction to non-state actors "would require this court to venture out
of the comfortable realm of established international law ... in which
states are the actors."4
Judge Leisure also recognized the possibility that the executive
32 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
33 Because much of this Note refers to historical evolution of the Alien Tort Act, the
original term "law of nations" will be used whenever possible, instead of "international law"
when describing the types of violations under the Alien Tort Act.
34 Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 739-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
35 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
36 Id. at 884-85.
37 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
38 Id. at 775.
39 Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 740-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The court also declined
jurisdiction under the TVPA, since the 1992 law specifically requires that a violation be
committed under the authority, or color of authority, of a foreign nation. Id. at 741-42. As
to the federal question jurisdiction,Judge Lesiure refused to find an implied right of action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "This Court declines to find an implied right of action arising under
the law of nations, specifically in view of the fact that Congress has addressed the matter and
created two express causes of action .. d.." M  at 743.
40 Id. All three concurring judges on the appellate panel dismissed the case on vastly
different grounds. Judge Edwards relied on Filartiga, but declined to extend it to non-state
actors, and gave an exhaustive historical analysis on the various interpretations of the Alien
Tort Statute since its enactment in 1789. He agreed with Filartigas extension of the statute
to remedy modern-day violations of the law of nations, but ultimately articulated an alterna-
tive standard for determining liability. Judge Edwards believed that his formulation was closer
to the original intent of the statute by requiring that § 1350 claims include a domestic
violation that also violates international law. In these cases, the domestic law provides the
applicable standard for determining liability. Id. at 775-84 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge
Bork's opinion disapproved of Fiartiga§ reasoning and stated that the Alien Tort Act was
essentially a dead letter since it did not provide a cause of action and it was intended to cover
only the three original violations as enumerated by Blackstone: piracy, safe passage, and the
slave trade. Id. at 798-820 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Robb wrote the shortest opinion of
the three, dismissing the action on grounds of "nonjusticiability." Id. at 824-29 (Robb, J.,
concurring).
41 Id. at 792. (Edwards, J., concurring).
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branch may eventually recognize Karadzic as an official head of
state.42 Karadzic could then claim immunity under the head of state
doctrine or the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)." In this
event, plaintiff's claims would turn into advisory opinions for which no
justiciable controversy exists." Judge Leisure ruled that this unique
possibility, while not "dispositive at this point in the litigation, militates
against this Court exercising jurisdiction."45
C. The Second Circuit Reverses
The Second Circuit disagreed withJudge Leisure's reasoning and
reversed, holding that subject matterjurisdiction was proper under the
Alien Tort Act.46 Judge John 0. Newman, writing for the three-judge
panel, held that "certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations
whether undertaken by those acting under auspices of a state or only
as private individuals."47
The court believed thatJudge Leisure's analysis of the state-action
requirement focused only on claims of torture." According to the
court, certain violations of the law of nations are considered universal
acts for which individuals, or "non-state actors," may be held liable.49
Historically, these crimes included piracy and slave trading, but the
court ruled that the list had been extended to include war crimes and
genocide.5" While the court noted that torture violations do require
state action, it suggested that most of the acts of torture were commit-
ted during Karadzic's alleged campaign of "ethnic cleansing" and were,
therefore, already incorporated into the plaintiffs' claims of genocide
and war crimes. 51
42 Doe, 866 F. Supp. at 738.
43 Id. FSIA is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (1988).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
47 Id. at 239.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 239-40. In extending war crimes and genocide to this list of international law
violations attributable to private actors, the court relied on a wide array of sources. One was
a Statement of the Interest of the United States, filed by United States Solicitor General Drew
Days, which restated the Executive Branch's position that private persons can be sued under
the Alien Tort Act for war crimes and genocide. Id. at 239-40. The Kadic court also looked
to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States and even Judge Edwards'
opinion in Tel-Oren, for additional support. Id. The court readJudge Edwards' state action
requirement as applying only to torture violations, noting that Edwards' acknowledged that
there exists, "a handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibil-
ity." Id. at 240 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 795 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
51 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-45. Of course, if Karadzic is considered a state actor, then the
allegations of torture alone will be sufficient to assert jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The court grouped the alleged atrocities
into three groups, genocide, war crimes and torture, to determine whether the offenses
1996]
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The court then addressed the state action requirement for law of
nations violations and posited that Karadzic may, in fact, be a state
actor.12  Under international law, a "state," is defined as "an entity
that has a defined territory, and a permanent population, under the
control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity
to engage in, formal relations with other entities."5 3 Although, Srpska
had not been recognized by the United States government, "[t]he
customary international law of human rights, such as the proscription
of official torture, applies to states without distinction between
recognized and unrecognized states."54
The Second Circuit's opinion also recognized a potential loophole
that would result from holding only "recognized" states liable for
international law violations.55 If the United States refused to recognize
a rebel state for foreign relations purposes, that non-recognition could
be used to shield the rebel government from "state actor" liability for
violations of the law of nations. 6 Official recognition by the United
States, on the other hand, might trigger other shields from liability,
such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act57 or the act of state
doctrine. Thus, a requirement that only recognized states can be
liable for law of nations violations may have the perverse effect of
creating a permanent shield from liability. 9 Finally, the court held
that service was not barred by the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement,' and that the case was not barred by the "political
question" doctrine.6
alleged violated the law of nations. The court conceded that it was too early in the litigation
process to determine whether the appellants would be able to prove the requisite elements
of genocide or war crimes. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244.
52 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-45.
53 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 201 (1986).
54 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. The district court noted that Srpska is a "military faction" and
does not constitute a state. Karadzic v. Doe, 866 F. Supp. 734, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
55 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
56 Id.
57 28 U.S.C. § 1330 to 1602-11 (1988).
58 See Banco Naconial de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 441-42 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting).
59 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. Furthermore, the court did not share the district court's
concerns that the Executive Branch may eventually recognize Karadzic as head of state, which
would transform the case into a call for a nonjusticiable advisory opinion and strip the court
of subject-matterjurisdiction. Id. at 248. Mere conjecture on the possibility of such an event
should not be a part of the court's consideration. Id. (holding that "the mere possibility that
Karadzic might at some future date be recognized by the United States as the head of state
of a friendly nation and might thereby acquire head-of-state immunity does not transform the
appellant's claims into a nonjusticiable request for an advisory opinion").
60 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1988).
61 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246-50. Because this case presents a host of interesting issues, this
Note focuses discussion on the propriety of subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Act and the liability for non-state actors for law of nations violations. While important,
discussion of service of process and the political question doctrine will be limited to their
[Vol. 21
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On November 15, 1995, Karadzic submitted a petition for
rehearing with the Second Circuit.62 Karadzic's lawyers directed the
court to a law review article written by ProfessorJoseph Sweeney, which
was not previously cited by either of the parties.6 The article asserted
that the Alien Tort Statute was enacted only to cover one type of tort
committed in violation of the law of nations-the unauthorized
boarding of vessels which were believed to be aiding the enemy during
wartime.'4 On January 4, 1996, the court denied the petition, noting
that this narrow interpretation of the statute was neither compelling
nor consistent with the broad reading of the Alien Tort Act espoused
by the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.65
The Second Circuit's reinstatement of the appellant's claims of
war crimes and genocide will certainly produce a wave of controversy
among the international legal community and constitutional scholars.
At the core of the controversy is the Alien Tort Act, and whether its
recent revival has been justifiable or whether it has overstepped the
bounds drawn for it over two centuries ago.
I1. Background Law
Part A of this section traces the historical origins and recent
evolution of the Alien Tort Act, with special emphasis on the Second
Circuit's landmark decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.66 Part B provides
a brief overview of the law of nations and whether it has historically
imposed liability on non-state actors.
A. The Alien Trt Act
The first alien tort provision was packaged as section 9 of the first
Judiciary Act of 1789. It was later codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and
reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."67
Since its inception in 1789, the Alien Tort Act has proved to be a
riddle to federal courts. 6 One reason for all of the confusion in the
courts is the absence of any legislative history specifically pertaining to
impact on the Alien Tort Act.
62 Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996).
63 Joseph Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L. &
COMP. L. REv. 445 (1995).
64 Id. at 447.
65 Kadic, 74 F.3d at 378.
66 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
67 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). The statute recognizes two possible violations: violations
of the law of nations and violations of U.S. treaties. Id. This Note focuses on the violations
of the law of nations segment of the statute.
68 See Jay M. Lewis Humphrey, Comment, A Legal Lohengrin: Federal Jurisdiction Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 105 (1979).
1996]
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the original Alien Tort Claim provision." Former United States
Supreme Court ChiefJustice Oliver Ellsworth, the principal drafter of
the Judiciary Act, left little evidence of the committee's actual
intent.70 A survey of the political landscape at the time, however,
provides many important clues as to why alienage jurisdiction was
included in the Judiciary Act.7 ' One of the principal fears of the
early national government was that if the United States did not
adequatelyadjudicate aliens' claims, it might provoke a foreign conflict
with the aliens' home state.72
1. Constitutional Origins
A noted shortcoming of the early Articles of Confederation
government was the inability of American courts to remedy wrongs
committed against aliens while in the United States.7" In fact, the law
of nations during this period dictated that if a nation failed to redress
a wrongful act against an alien, it would be accountable to the alien's
home state.74 Thus, the lack of an appropriate forum to redress
injuries to an alien could perhaps escalate into an international
crisis. 7
5
The young nation's fears were confirmed during an altercation
known as the Longchamps affair.76 The Chevalier de Longchamps,
a French adventurer of "obscure and worthless character,"77 assaulted
Francis Barbe Marbois, then-Consul General of France and Secretary
of the French Legation.78 The failure of the national government to
remedy the act was thrust into the international spotlight as
Longchamps was released on bail. Fortunately, Longchamps was finally
brought to trial and convicted of a common-law crime in Pennsylvania.
Longchamps was prosecuted by James Wilson,79 who argued that
Longchamps should be punished in order to "vindicate the honor of
69 Castro, supra note 1, at 495
70 Id.
71 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782-86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
72 Id.
73 See Castro, supra note 1, at 494. Additionally, since state courts were given discre-
tionaryjurisdiciton over suits involving aliens injured in America, the Continental Congress
was concerned that, if the states refused to exercise jurisdiction, it could provoke retaliation
from the alien's home state. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794 (Edwards, J., concurring).
74 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 284-91 (6th ed. 1963).
75 Id.; see also Humphrey, supra note 68, at 105, 113-15 (stating that "[a] private wrong
by one person to an individual alien could escalate into an affront by one sovereign nation
to another").
76 Castro, supra note 1, at 491-93.
77 Id. at 491.
78 Id.
79 James Wilson was one of the lesser-celebrated Founding Fathers and was urged to
help his native Pennsylvania and its Attorney General convict de Longchamps. See generally
PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON, FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798, 195-96 (1956).
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Pennsylvania and [to assure] the safety of her citizens abroad.""°
The same fears resurfaced as the drafters of the Constitution
defined new national powers for the United States. The authors of the
Federalist Papers repeatedly emphasized the need for a national voice
in foreign relations.8" Alexander Hamilton observed that "the union
will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of
its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be
accompanied with the faculty of preventing it." 2 James Madison
voiced his concern that the courts must be able to "prevent those
violations of the law of nations and of treaties which if not prevented
must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars.""
Thus, as the D.C. Circuit Court recently noted, "[a]s best we can
tell, the aim of § 1350 was to place, in federal court, actions implicat-
ing foreign affairs." 4 Accordingly, it is highly likely that the drafters
of section 9 of the Judiciary Act did not intend to address claims
involving two aliens in foreign countries, since United States foreign
affairs would not likely be implicated. 5 Even Oliver Ellsworth, in a
letter to Jonathan Trumbell in 1796, stated his belief that the United
States lacked legislative jurisdiction over actions taking place in foreign
countries.8 6
2. Review of Case Law 1960 - 1980
The Alien Tort Act remained dormant through most of the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. With the exception of one
early case, Bolchos v. Darrell,8 7 the federal courts rarely heard, and
never upheld a claim brought under the Alien Tort Act until 1960.88
Beginning in the mid-1900s, however, the Act began to resurface in the
federal courts. By this time, the law of nations had evolved into a
broad body of substantive law which was considerably different than it
was at the time the Alien Tort Act was enacted.
As a result, federal courts began to read the statute differently in
light of the various interpretations of the modem international law.89
80 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 113 (1784).
81 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 3 (John Jay).
82 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
83 Castro, supra note 1, at 494 (statement ofJames Madison).
84 Tel-Oren v. Libyan-Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
85 See id. at 784 n.13; see also Castro, supra note 1, at 484 (stating that "[a]ctivities
involving aliens in foreign countries stand on an entirely different footing").
86 Castro, supra note 1, at 485 n.97.
87 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795).
88 Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
89 Compare id. (domestic law violations and passport violations actionable under the law
of nations) with Lopes v. Reederrei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (1963) (doctrine of
unseaworthiness not a law of nations violation). See Dreyfus v. Von Fink, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31
(2d Cir. 1976) ("there has been little judicial interpretation of what constitutes the law of
1996]
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Thus, any violation of the law of nations would be actionable under
United States laws such as the Alien Tort Act. The federal courts,
construing the Alien Tort Act in the context of 20th century law of
nations principles, operated under the Supreme Court's directive in
The Paquette Habana that the law of nations was a part of the law of the
United States, and has been a part of our colonial heritage.9 °
Nevertheless, until 1980, federal courts were not the most
hospitable forums for suits under the Alien Tort Act. In fact, until
1980, federal courts had only once, in 1960, affirmed jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Act for a violation of the law of nations.91 The
Second Circuit proved especially reluctant to use the Act to remedy law
of nations violations.9 2 In fact, the Second Circuit very narrowly
construed the phrase "law of nations" when hearing cases involving the
Alien Tort Act. For example, in ITT v. Vencap,9' the Second Circuit,
nations and no universally accepted definition of the phrase"). One court's oft-quoted
formulation for deciphering law of nations violations under the Alien Tort Act included:
a violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a)
affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign
state, and (b) used by those state for their common good and/or in dealings inter
se.
Lopes, 225 F. Supp. at 297.
90 The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that international law is part
of the laws of the United States and should be administered by the courts); Edwin D.
Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
26 (1953) (arguing that "it is an ancient and salutary feature of the Anglo-American legal
tradition that the Law of Nations is a part of the law of the land to be ascertained and
administered, like any other, in the appropriate case."). But seeA. Mark Weisburd, State Courts,
Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALEJ. INT'L. LAw 1 (1995), A. Mark Weisburd, The
Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1212-1233 (1988). Professor
Weisburd provides significant criticism of the view that international law is part of the laws
of the United States. He contends, inter alia, that neither our legal origins nor the early 19th
century Supreme Court cases necessitate any such result. Id.
91 Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D.Md. 1961). The other case in which jurisdiction
had been granted under the Alien Tort Act was Bolchos v. Darre, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795)
(No. 1607). In Adra, the U.S. District Court in Maryland allowed jurisdiction for a claim
brought by a Lebanese plaintiff, who alleged that his former wife took their child to the U.S.
illegally under an Iraqi passport, concealed the child's true identity, and refused to return
the child to his custody when she became nine years old as required by Muslim and Lebanese
law. Adra 195 F. Supp. at 860-61. Despite an expansive reading of the statute with regard to
a "tort committed in violation of the law of nations," the Adra court did, in fact, base part of
its rationale on the statute's original purpose-to confer jurisdiction over suits implicating
foreign affairs. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff was a citizen of a friendly country with
long-standing foreign relations contacts, and that "the importance of foreign relations to our
country today cautions federal courts to give weight to such considerations and not to decline
jurisdiction given by an Act of Congress unless required to do so by dominant consider-
ations." Id.
92 See infra notes 93-98; see also, Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d
49 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that the court would not order seamen to stop picketing because
plaintiffs had no right under international saw to grant them relief); Farroq Hassan, Panacea
or Mirage? Domestic Enforcement of International Human Rights Law Into Domestic Law-U.S.
Experience, 4 HOUS. INT'L. L.J. 13, 17-18 (1981).
93 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
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noting that the Alien Tort was "a kind of legal Lohergrin"94 of
unknown origins, refused to sustain jurisdiction for securities theft
under the statute because "stealing" was not considered a violation of
the law of nations.95 Similarly, in Dreyfus v. Von Finck,96 the court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of claims by German citizens who
alleged that the defendants wrongfully seized their property in
violation of the law of nations.9 7 Part of the rationale for the court's
dismissal was that "violations of international law do not occur when
the aggrieved parties are national of the acting state."98
C. The Filartiga Decision
In 1980, the Second Circuit breathed new life into the Alien Tort
Act with its expansive holding in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala99 The court
held that a Paraguayan citizen could sue for acts of torture committed
against him in Paraguay, by a Paraguyan official."°° Neither United
States citizens nor United States soil was involved in the case.
In upholding what can best be described as "worldwide jurisdic-
tion, "101 the court essentially by-passed any examination of the
historical origins of the Alien Tort Act and its underlying purpose of
94 Humphrey, supra note 68, at 105 n.3. Lohengrin was a mysterious mythical stranger
in a medieval tale who eventually revealed himself as the son of Percival, keeper of the Holy
Grail. Id.
95 Id. at 105 (stating that "it is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated
that the wrong is of mutual and merely several concern, by means of express international
accords, that a wrong generally becomes recognized as an international law violation within
the meaning of the statute.").
96 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
97 Id. at 25.
98 Id. at 31 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 441-42
(1964) (White, J., dissenting); Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 186 N.E. 679 (N.Y. 1933).
99 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
100 Id.
101 "Worldwidejurisdiction" is a term that refers to when U.S. domestic courts hear cases
arising out of foreign nations and involving foreign citizens or governments. One should be
careful not to confuse such jurisdiction with "universal jurisdiction," a term used in interna-
tional law to describe domestic jurisdiction over certain crimes for which ordinary jurisdic-
tional rules do not apply. The traditional concept of universal jurisdiction centered on the
pirate as a hostis humani generis-an enemy of all mankind who loses his national character
and may be brought to justice anywhere. Castro, supra note 1, at 486. Crimes of universal
jurisdiction are extremely few (piracy, possibly war crimes, and genocide) and are distin-
guished from a larger list of "recognized" law of nations violations. Compare Restatement of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 (1987) with id. at § 702. The doctrine,
however, is unsettled, because no consensus exists as to its current scope. Worldwide
jurisdiction simply describes the federal court's notion that any of the law of nations
violations alleged from the larger list in a § 1350 action is enough to permit the courts to
assertjurisdiction worldwide. The courts have not required that the violation be a crime that
warrants "universal jurisdiction," probably because of the lack of consensus existing on the
matter. Even the courts which have attempted to use the concept of universal jurisdiction
have been inconsistent with its application. For instance, in Filartiga, the court described the
torturer as hostis humani generis like the pirate, but still required a showing of state action that
is inconsistent with the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.
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ensuring peaceful foreign relations. Despite the historical evidence
strongly suggesting that Congress intended to use the Alien Tort Act
as a tool to prevent foreign affairs controversies, the court focused less
on the underlying intent of the statute and more on whether there was
"a tort was committed in violation of law of nations."102 The Filartiga
court ruled that "the constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Act is the
Law of Nations, which has always been part of the federal common
law."'03 Therefore, while United States foreign affairs may not have
been directly implicated, the court ruled that the law of nations was
implicated, and so the Alien Tort statute provided an appropriate
forum for the dispute." 4
The Filartiga court construed the law of nations, according to the
principles originally laid out by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Smith?°" "The law of nations may be ascertained by consulting the
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general
usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and
enforcing that law." 1 6 The court cited an extensive array of authori-
ty, such as the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights0 7 and the Univer-
sal Declaration Against Torture,'08 which proclaimed that torture was
now prohibited by the law of nations.0 9 Further, the court stated
that under modern principles of the law of nations, a state's treatment
of its own citizens was a matter of grave international concern.110
Thus, federal courts could hear properly alleged violations of the law
of nations regardless of where the alleged tort was committed."'
The court's holding explicitly overruled its earlier dicta in Dreyfus
v. Von Finck, that law of nations violations do not occur "when the
aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state.""' 2 The court
characterized the language in Dreyfus as "clearly out of tune with the
current usage and practice of international law," and stated that the
law of nations "confers fundamental rights upon people vis-a-vis their
own governments.""'
102 Filartiga, 670 F.2d at 876.
103 Id. at 885.
104 Id. at 878-84.
105 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
106 Id. at 160-61.
107 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) (A)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
108 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, GA.
3452, 30 U.N.Doc. A/1034 (1975).
109 Id. "[S]everal commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has
become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law." Fiartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States
Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 813, 816-17 n.18 (1978)).
110 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
111 Id. at 885 (citing Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161 (1774)).
112 Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
113 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
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Filartiga opened up new doors for adjudicating international
human rights abuses. The court in Filartiga re-interpreted the purpose
of the Alien Tort Act to provide a forum for redressing any tortious law
of nations violations committed against any alien, without regard to the
nationality of the defendant or the place of the violation." 4 As the
Second Circuit would note seven years later in a decision based largely
upon Filartiga, "[t]he evolving standards of international law govern
who is within the statute's jurisdictional grant as clearly as they govern
what conduct creates jurisdiction. ""'
Not all judges, however, rushed to embrace the Second Circuit's
expansive reading of the Alien Tort Act. In 1985, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals handed down Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.116
the first significant Alien Tort Act decision in the wake of Filartiga In
Tel-Oren, the three-judge panel dismissed claims brought by survivors
of those murdered by a PLO attack on a civilian bus in Israel." 7 The
dismissal was the only thing the three judges, Judge Edwards, Judge
Bork and Senior Judge Robb, could agree on, as each wrote a separate
concurrence based on completely different rationales."8  Judge
Edwards' concurrence in Tel-Oren accepted Filartiga as binding, albeit,
narrow precedent. While Filartiga mandated that torture be committed
by a state actor, Edwards could not justifiably characterize the PLO as
a recognized state." 9 Judge Edwards expressed a deep concern with
Filartiga's use of international law to determine standards of liability
under the Alien Tort statute. 2 Judge Edwards also expressed
concern over extending jurisdiction to suits involving two aliens, since
it could provoke the same types of foreign relations crises that the
statute was intended to prevent.' Judge Bork's opinion flatly
rejected Filartiga on the basis that § 1350 gives plaintiffs no "right to
sue," and such expansive jurisdiction violated separation of powers
principles, which ignored the original intent of the Framers.'22
Judge Robb dismissed the actions as "nonjusticiable."'23
In 1989, the Supreme Court added a major wrinkle in Alien Tort
114 See Id.
115 Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir.
1987), rev'don other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
116 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
117 Id
118 Id.
119 Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards instead proposes an alternative
formulation for determining the standard of liability. His approach, similar to the one used
in Adra v. Clift, required a pleading of a violation of both municipal and international law,
but used municipal law as the standard of liability. Judge Edwards believed this approach to
provide a much more workable standard for the courts to follow. Id. at 781-91.
121 Id. at 784 n.13.
122 Id. at 801-23.
123 Id. at 823-27.
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Act's jurisdictional analysis. In Argentine Republic v. Amareda Hess
Shipping Corp.,'24 the Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act (FSIA) would trump the Alien Tort Act as a means of
determining jurisdiction in federal courts.2 5  The FSIA would
therefore become the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state. 116 This holding would seem to have a chilling effect on
Filartiga's expansion of the Alien Tort Act, especially in cases where a
plaintiff is pursuing law of nations violations against states for
mistreatment of their own citizens.
At least one federal court, however, has astutely maneuvered
around the FSIA in an Alien Tort Act case. In In re Estate of Ferdinand
E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation,127 the Ninth Circuit asserted
jurisdiction over a claim by a Philippine mother that her son had been
kidnapped, interrogated, and tortured to death by Philippine military
personnel controlled by Marcos's daughter, Imee Marcos-Mantoc1 28
The court found that there was no jurisdiction under the FSIA because
Marcos-Mantoc admitted to acting on her own authority rather than
under the authority of the Republic of the Philippines.19 Thus, the
court found that Marcos-Mantoc could be tried under the Alien Tort
Act as a state official.1
30
The court reaffirmed Filartiga's premise that the Alien Tort Act
may be used to remedy any violation of the law of nations, no matter
where it occurred or who the parties were. In fact, the court explicitly
stated that it "did not share"13' Marcos' concern that, "contrary to the
original purpose behind § 1350, to permit cases of this sort would
invite, rather than avoid, controversy with foreign nations."13 2 The
court felt that there were other devices to quell potential foreign
relations problems, although none were present in Marcos-Mantoc133
Led by the new guideposts staked out in Filartiga, the federal
courts have recently revitalized the Alien Tort Act. In doing so, courts
have concentrated their focus on whether the plaintiffs simply have
alleged a recognized violation of the law of nations.3 4 If so, then the
courts have been willing to exercise jurisdiction irrespective of where
124 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
128 Id. at 495-96.
129 Id. at 497-98.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 500.
132 I1&
133 Id. The court noted that even if statutory limitations such as the FSIA are not
available, other judicial limitations such as forum non conviens and venue restrictions will
usually be available. Id.
134 Filartiga, v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 21
RE-FRAMING THE ALIEN TORT ACT
the act was committed or who committed it.1l 5
B. Liability of State Actors for Violations of the Law of Nations
The Filartiga threshold test for jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Act hinged on whether the plaintiff pleaded a recognized law of
nations violation.'36 If so, § 1350 opened the door to the federal
courts. But Filartiga held that the law of nations imposed liability only
for torture caused by state actors. 1 7 The question was left open as
to whether other law of nations violations--such as war crimes,
genocide and other international human rights violations-might apply
to non-state actors as well.' 38
For a rule to become part of the law of nations, however, it must
command the "general assent of civilized nations." 39 This require-
ment was intended to be a strict one.'"° Whether certain violations
of the law of nations applies to non-state actors, therefore, turns on
whether non-state actor liability has become a recognized norm within
the law of nations.
The law of nations covered a markedly different landscape in the
eighteenth century than it does today. Blackstone described the law
of nations as "a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and
established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the
world."' 4' In the nineteenth century, Justice Story similarly surmised
that "the law of nations is also called the law of nature; it is founded
on the common consent as well as the common sense of the
world."' While some scholars noted that the early law of nations
was to be a "universal law binding upon all mankind,' 43 Blackstone
enumerated three major violations of international law: violations of
safe conducts, infringements on the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy.'
Most importantly, however, the law of nations in the 18th century
135 Id. at 885-89.
136 Id. at 878.
137 Id.
138 Id.
'39 Id. at 880 (quoting The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
140 Id. The court stated "Were this not so, the courts of one nation might feel free to
impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others in the name of applying international law". Id.
141 4 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66 (1954).
142 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 670 (1865). The Prize cases are better-known for
granting President Lincoln the Constitutional authority to take action as Commander-in-Chief
against the southern states in rebellion, on the grounds that a state of war in fact existed, and
had been ratified, despite the fact that the Union had not officially declared war. Id.
143 Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 26-27 (1952) (citing Dumbauld, Hugo Grotius: The Father oflnternational
Law, I JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 117, 118-26 (1952)).
144 4 BLACKSTONE at 66. See also, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., concurring).
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was clearly binding on individuals as well as states.'45 In fact, an
analysis of early United States case law finds examples of non-state
actor liability for each of Blackstone's enumerated offenses. 46 Prior
to Filartiga, the only two cases in which § 1350 had been upheld
involved law of nations violations committed by non-state actors. 47
The recent § 1350 cases, however, have followed Filartiga's
reasoning that when construing the law of nations, one must interpret
it "not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the
world today."4 ' Modern international law, "as it exists in the world
today" was formed largely in response to the horrors exposed after the
First and Second World Wars and is still equivocal on the concept of
individual liability. 49  While some commentators adamantly assert
that individuals possess both rights and duties under the law of
nations,50 most courts have held fast to the belief that the law of
nations does not impose duties upon individuals) 51
War crimes and genocide represent two of the four acts which are
firmly entrenched as international law violations subject to "unequivo-
cal international condemnation. "152 Some commentators have also
attempted to list war crimes and genocide as acts to which "universal
145 Dickinson, supra note 143, at 27 (stating that the law of nations was concerned
somewhat indiscriminately with matters between individuals, between individuals and states,
and between states);Jay M. Lewis Humphrey, Comment, A Legal Lohengrin, Federal Jurisdic-
tion Under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 112 (1979); Arthur M.
Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1206, 1224 (1988).
Cf Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792 n.22 (Edwards, J., concurring) Judge Edwards argued that
"[C]lassical international law was predominately stalest." Id. (citingJ. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS (1963)).
148 See, e.g., Respublica v. Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 117 (1784) (private
individual liable for assault and battery of an ambassador); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 163 (1820) (individual held liable for piracy); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810,
814-15 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (individual held liable under §1350 for violation of a treaty
between France and the United States).
147 Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810; Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
148 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
149 Id.
150 JordanJ. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Frivate Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV.
HUM. RTs.J. 51, 51 (1992). Paust boldly asserts that there should be no debate as to whether
private individuals have duties under the law of nations, especially with regard to human
rights. He dismisses as erroneous all of the recent federal court decisions which state
otherwise. Id. at 52-53.
151 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-96 (Edwards,J, concurring) The view supporting non-state
actor liability "is not so widely accepted doctrinally or practically as to represent the consensus
among nations." Id. However, Judge Scalia asserts that when the Alien Tort Act first
appeared, it may have been intended to cover only private, nongovernmental acts. Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In Re Estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 501 (9th Cir. 1992). Some cases specifically
hold that torture is not a violation for which non-state actors may be held liable. See, e.g.,
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889-90; Linder v. Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
152 Id. at 791 n. 20.
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jurisdiction" attaches. 153 In the international law context, universal
jurisdiction attaches to certain crimes which are so heinous that the
international community seeks to punish the offenders wherever they
may reside and their liability follows them everywhere.154  The
doctrine is synonymous with the concept of hostis humani generis, and
therefore applies to the pirate and the slave trader.'55 The law is
unsettled, however, and well short of a consensus, as to whether war
criminals and genocidists fall into this category. The question that
American courts had not had a chance to address before Kadic was
whether war crimes and genocide are acts for which non-state actors
may be held liable - or perhaps more importantly, whether the law
of nations ever meant to distinguish between state and non-state actors
for such evil and universally deplored acts.
War crimes and genocide were among the horrors exposed during
World War II and were painfully recounted during the Nuremberg
Trials. War crimes, codified largely in the Geneva Conventions, are
generally described as barbaric acts committed during hostilities and
have continually been condemned by international law as offenses
against the law of war.'56 "Genocide" was coined in 1944 by Raphael
Lemkin, a member of the American prosecution staff at
Nuremburg. 5 7 Genocide had been present in many atrocious forms
throughout human history, but it was the massive extinction of
hundreds of thousands ofJews in Germany and Poland that finally sent
shock waves throughout the civilized world and brought genocide into
the forefront of the international human rights movement. 58 The
international community responsed by drafting the Convention on the
Preventation and Punishment of Gencoide, which was enacted into law
in over 100 countries.159
15' Castro, supra note 1, at 486. LYAL S. SUNGA, INDrVIDUAL LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 103 (1992); See also supra note 101.
154 See Sunga, supra note 153.
155 Id.; see also Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 62-64.
156 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946); see generally, Telford Taylor, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBURG TRIALS, 1-20 (1992) (thorough account of the historical evolution of war
crimes, citing numerous historical codifications on the laws of war).
157 Taylor, supra note 155, at 102. Lemkin defined genocide as "the extermination of
racial and national groups." Id.; see also, WARREN FREEDMAN, GENOCIDE: A PEOPLES WILL TO
LIvE 11-14 (1992). Genocide is a word derived from two Latin roots, "genos" meaning family
or clan and "occido" meaning extermination. Id. at 11. Before Lemkin coined the phrase,
genocide was literally an anonymous crime. In a 1940 radio broadcast, Winston Churchill was
forced to describe the horrors committed by the Nazis in Poland as a "crime without a
name." Id. The Nuremburg Tribunal, however, rejected this term and used "crimes against
humanity" instead. Id.
158 Id. at 37-41.
159 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; U.N. GAOR U.N.Doc. A/810, p.
174 (1951). Over 100 states were parties to the agreement. The United States, however, was
the last of the over one hundred nations to ratify the agreement. It finally did so almost forty
years later on February 19, 1986.. For an enlightening discussion on the history of the
ratification process and the reason that some U.S. conservative senators had cold feet for so
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The Kadic court was not the first court to assert jurisdiction over
alleged international human rights offenders in foreign states. But the
court was the first to extend the worldwide jurisdiction trumpeted in
Filartiga to reach non-state actors for certain law of nations viola-
tions.16 0
v. Analysis
This section analyzes the Second Circuit's treatment of two major
issues arising out of the Kadic cases. The first issue addresses the crux
of the Kadic decision: whether certain violations of the law of nations
impose liability regardless of state action.' 6 ' The second issue is
whether "worldwide jurisdiction" is proper under § 1350. This issue
involves a brief critique of Filartiga and challenges future courts to
remain true to the historical purpose of § 1350.6' Additionally, this
section discusses some of the practical problems with United States
courts hearing politically sensitive cases arising outside of its jurisdic-
tion.1 63
A. Pushing Filartiga Even Further
Filartiga made its stopping point clear. It limited the Alien Tort
Act's jurisdiction over torture claims to those against state actors.1
The issue that ultimately crystallized in Kadic was whether § 1350
jurisdiction applies to non-state actors for other law of nations
violations, such as war crimes and genocide. 65
The Kadic court ruled that, unlike torture, liability for genocide
and war crimes should be binding on both state actors and non-state
actors.166 While there may be no consensus as to whether non-state
actor liability should attach to every law of nations violation, 67 the
court believed that there was a consensus that liability should attach to
both war crimes and genocide, without regard to, whether the
long, see WARREN FREEDMAN, A PEOPLE'S WILL TO LIVE at 155-205 (1992); see also LAWRENCE
J. LEBLANC, THE UNITES STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION (1991).
160 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)
161 See infra notes 164-204.
162 See infra notes 205-32.
163 See infra notes 233-39.
164 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
165 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
166 Id. at 244.
167 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792-94 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); CompareJordan Paust, The OtherSide of Right:
Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 51 (1992)("it should be beyond
doubt that private individuals can have duties under treaty-based and customary international
law") with Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 435
(1964) (stating that there is a long way to go to establishing private duties under international
law).
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perpetrators were "state actors. " 1
The court analyzed several recognized international authorities
and found no evidence that liability for war crimes or genocide should
be restricted to state actors.169 The court noted that The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 170
described genocide as an "odious scourge," from which mankind must
be liberated, 7 1 It plainly states that "[p]ersons committing genocide
• . . shall be punished whether they are Constitutionally responsible
rulers, or private individuals."1'7  This broad sweep of liability clearly
applies to all individuals, not just those acting under constitutionally
responsible rulers, as some might suggest.17  The Genocide Conven-
tion Implementation Act of 1987,17 also cited by the court, imposes
criminal liability without regard to the status of the offender.
Furthermore, the Restatement and other commentators support the
court's conclusion that non-state actors may be liable for genocide. 75
As noted earlier, war crimes were universally condemned by the
international community at the Geneva Conventions. 176  The Kadic
court noted that the four Geneva Conventions codified the laws of war
and prohibited all forms of war crimes. 77  In particular, common
article 3, which is almost the same in all four of the Geneva Conven-
tions, binds "all parties" to a conflict from committing various acts
which constitute war crimes.178 The court read common article 3 as
authority which binds "parties to internal conflicts regardless of
whether they are recognized nations or roving hordes of insur-
gents."' 79
Moreover, the United Nations' recent enactment of an Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Law in the Former Yugosalvia' 80 simply
168 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244. The court stated "[i]t suffices to hold at this stage that the
alleged atrocities are actionable under the Alien Tort Act, without regard to state action, to
the extent that they were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes." Id.
169 Id. at 241-43.
170 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; U.N. GAOR U.N.Doc. A/810, p.
174 (1951).
171 1d
172 Id. at 280.
173 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244.
174 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988). The act was spearheaded by Senator William Proxmire, who
was tired of U.S. foot-dragging on the issue of ratification and who had made over 3,000
speeches on the Senate floor. Freedman, supra note 154, at 158.
175 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987); Blum & Steinhardt, supa note 1, at 94; Paust, supra note 150, at 57.
176 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 241.
177 Id. at 242.
178 Id. at 242-43.
179 Id., 70 F.3d at 243.
180 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 827, The International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
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refers to "any person" who commits international crimes, and therefore
does not require that such person be a state actor.'' One noted
commentator, Professor Howard S. Levie, declared that "it is indisput-
able that ... [the U.N. Tribunal] has been given jurisdiction to try
individuals charged with violations of the provisions of international
humanitarian law."' 82 This most recent pronouncement of individual
liability for war crimes provides additional support for the court's
holding, and is directly on point since it is specifically desinged to try
war criminals like Karadzic for war crimes similar to those in Kadic.'81
With regard to torture, the court found that there was sufficient
authority stating that liability may only be imposed on state actors.'84
Both the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act8 5 and Filartiga require
that the torturer be a state actor for liability to attach.' The court
did not try and reconcile why liability for torture required state action
while liability for war crimes and genocide did not. ' One reason
may be that the distinction between state-actor and non-state actor
liability for war crimes and genocide is rather impractical. Since these
acts often involve the "deliberate and systematic"188 extinction of
entire populations, it is hard to imagine any situation in which the
international community would seek to limit or absolve liabilities for
such actions.8 9 Additionally, genocide is almost always the product
of mass-organizational campaigns to exterminate a particular group or
groups of people.' 90 The international community probably does not
foresee a group of private individuals waging an extermination
campaign without the backing of some sort of governmental, rebel or
military organization.
Though the Kadic court ruled that liability for acts of torture
would require state action, it provided the district court with guidelines
for determining Karadzic's status as a state actor. In perhaps the most
strategic ruling in the opinion, the court ruled that in determining
Srpska's status as a "state," the district court should use the internation-
al definition of "state," rather than relying on whether or not an entity
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Art. 7, U.N. Document
S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter U.N. Tribunal].
181 Id, see 1 MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND VIRGINIA MORRIS, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 91-103 (1995). "Individual
responsibility for unlawful behavior is the essence of criminal law" Id. at 91.
182 Howard S. Levie, The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A
Comparison with the Past and a Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L. L. & COM. 1 (1995).
183 See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 63-84.
184 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1995).
185 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Note (Supp. V. 1994).
186 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
187 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-45.
188 Freedman, supra note 157, at 17.
189 Sunga, supra note 153, at 35-36.
190 Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 94.
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such as Srpska has been recognized by the United States.'91 While
United States law looks to the Executive Branch's determination as to
whether an entity has been recognized as a "state,"192 international
law provides a much more lenient formulation of statehood. 9 '
Under international law, a state is an entity which has "a defined
territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own
government, and that engages in, and has the capacity to engage in
formal relations with other countries." '94 Furthermore, the Restate-
ment explains that a territory which meets these requirements is a
"state" regardless of whether it is officially recognized by other
states.'95 The Kadic court held that the Bosnian-Serbian entity known
as Srpska falls clearly under this definition since it has a President and
legislature, as well as its own currency and has also entered into
agreements with other governments. 196 Furthermore, it has carved
out its own territory within Bosnia where it governs the populations
that reside there.'97 Other courts have recognized this international
standard for statehood as defined by international law, 98 even when
they have not exclusively applied it. 99
Moreover, the court noted a potential problem which could arise
if an entity such as Srpska was defined according to official recognition
or non-recognition by the United States.2"' Official recognition by
the United States would allow Karadzic to avail himself of a number of
official immunities, such as the head of state doctrine or the FSIA.2°'
However, if Srpska is not recognized by the United States, Karadzic
would be a non-state actor and therefore could not be liable for acts
of torture under the law of nations as interpreted by the federal courts
in both Filartiga and Tel-Oren. Thus, requiring official recognition to
191 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-45.
192 National Petrochemical Company of Iran v. M/T Sholt Leaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d.
Cir. 1988); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (arguing that "[o]ur courts have in the past looked to the foreign
policy of this nation, in particular to the recognition or non-recognition of a foreign govern-
ment, to determine the applicability of a given legal doctrine.")
193 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201,
cmt. b (1986).
194 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1986); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
195 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201, cmt. b (1986).
196 Kadic, 70 F.Sd at 245.
197 Id.
198 Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47; National Petrochemical Company of Iran v. M/T Stolt
Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988).
199 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) ("it is conceivable that a state not recognized
by the United States is a state as defined by international law and therefore bound by
international law responsibilities.").
200 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
201 See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
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hold Karadzic liable as a "state actor" would provide a permanent
shield from liability.20 2 Judge Newman maintained that this result
would be "perverse," 203 and thus chose the more flexible internation-
al definition of state to determine state action. 4 Under the interna-
tional formulation, the Executive Branch can refuse to recognize states
without fearing that non-recognition would preclude federal courts
from imposing liability over international criminals from that state.
B. Reigning In Worldwide Jurisdiction
1. Filartiga vs. The Framers
In the first sentence of his opinion, Judge Newman admits that
"[m] ost Americans would probably be surprised to learn that victims
of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of the insurgent
Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in Manhat-
tan."205 This statement crystallizes the concept of worldwide jurisdic-
tion and impliedly concedes that the reach of American courts into
foreign countries may be excessive. The issue for the court was
whether such an intrusion was authorized by such an antiquated statute
which had been dormant for nearly two hundred years.206
Armed with Filartiga and the backing of the Executive Branch ,2°7
the court omitted any discussion on the appropriateness of exercising
"worldwide" jurisdiction in this case and instead relied exclusively on
the Filartiga formulation.20 8  Filartiga and its offspring2 9 provide
well-established precedent that federal courts have jurisdiction for a
recognized law of nations violation committed against any alien
anywhere in the world.2 0 Despite its precedential authority, Filartiga
never confronts the historical evidence pointing out the real purpose
of the original § 1350: to allow aliens to bring suits in U.S. federal
courts in order to avoid a foreign conflict with the alien's home
state.21' Allowing worldwide jurisdiction over aliens' claims in today's
highly politicized international community might often trigger the
202 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 236.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 239-40.
208 Id. at 238-39; see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1980).
209 In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987); rev'd on other
groun4 488 U.S. 428 (1989); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass 1995); Paul
v Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
210 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236. ("[Filartiga] ... validly creates federal court jurisdiction for
suits alleging torts committed anywhere in the world against aliens in violation of the law of
nations.")
211 See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
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opposite effect of instigating such conflict."'
It is clear from the courts, commentators, and the Framers that
the prevention of a foreign crisis was an underlying motivation behind
§ 1350.2"3 The Longchamps affair and other instances of unre-
dressed acts against aliens during the pre-Constitution era made it
clear to the Framers that their inability to properly adjudicate aliens'
claims might give rise to unwanted international tensions. 21 4 Hamil-
ton summarized these sentiments most eloquently in the Federalist No.
80:
A denial or perversion ofjustice by the sentence of the courts, as well as
in any other manner is with reason classed among the just causes of war,
it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.
2 1 5
The Framers were therefore only concerned with redressing acts
for which the United States would be held accountable-namely, those
acts committed against aliens by U.S. citizens or on U.S. soil.216  If,
on the other hand, neither U.S. citizens nor soil is involved, then a
foreign nation would have no reason to look to the United States for
proper adjudication of a dispute, and therefore no foreign conflict
212 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork,J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
213 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating "the intent of this section was to
assure aliens access to federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if mishandled by a state
court, might blossom into an international crisis"); Jay M. Lewis Humphrey, Comment, A
Legal Lohengrin, Federal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 112
(1979) (arguing that "[ilt was precisely to avoid such damage to foreign relations that the
ATCA was enacted"); Debra A. Harvey, Note, The Alien Tort Statute: International Watchdog or
Simply 'Historical Trivia'?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 343 (1988) (contending that "the
framers recognized that the world community would hold the national government
accountable for the actions of American citizens"); E. Hardy Smith, Note, Federal Jurisdiction
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Can this Antiquated Statute Fulfill Its Modern Role?, 27 ARiz. L.
REV. 437, 444 n.49 (1985) (stating "[t]he drafters were therefore justifiably concerned that an
alien's unredressed claim might develop into an international confrontation"); see also Adra
v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D.Md. 1961) (explaining that "the importance of foreign
relations to our country today" warrants the exercise of jurisdiction over an alien from a
friendly country who seeks to have his daughter returned to him from the United States
where she was wrongfully taken in violation of the law of nations"); In re Estate of Marcos,
978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (court implicitly acknowledged, but dismissed defendant's
argument that federal courts hearing "foreign" cases would hurt, not help U.S. foreign
relations).
Though no official legislative history is available, the historical evidence surrounding the
Judiciary Act has proved to be compelling evidence for uncovering the staute's purpose.
Judge Edwards traced and relied on the historical underpinnings of § 1350 in formulating
his concurrence in Tel-Oren. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782-783 (Edwawds, J., concurring).
Professor Castro, in his exhaustive analysis of § 1350, maintains that "notwithstanding
frequent complaints about the obscurity of § 1350's origins, a thorough study of available
historical materials provides a fairly clear understanding of the statute's purpose." Castro,
supra note 1, at 488. Despite historical evidence as to the original purpose of § 1350, no
court has ever denied jurisdiction on this basis alone.
214 Castro, supra note 1, at 488-94.
215 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
216 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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would emerge.217
The federal courts' use of § 1350 to assert jurisdiction between
actions between two aliens for acts committed on foreign soil, is
completely at odds with the statute's underlying goal of promoting and
maintaining peaceful foreign relations.218  Asserting worldwide
jurisdiction in such a situation is likely to provoke the very type of
conflict the statute hoped to prevent. Judge Bork remarked that
[f]or a young weak nation, one anxious to avoid foreign entanglements
and embroilment in Europe's disputes, to undertake casually and without
debate to regulate the conduct of other nations and individuals abroad,
conduct without an effect upon the interests of the United States, would
be a piece of breathtaking folly-so breathtaking as to render incredible
any reading of the statute that produces such results. 1
It is clear that when a federal court seeks to regulate the activities
of foreign citizens or governments which occur in foreign states, it is
almost certain that such actions will provoke resentment and possibly
retaliation from the foreign state."O Since such a result flies directly
in the face of the statute's original intent, it is difficult to understand
why Filartiga and its supporters have ignored this problem. Filartiga
stressed the importance of reading the law of nations clause of § 1350
as it stands today rather than as it stood in 1789. But even if § 1350 is
read to include the evolution of new violations (e.g. torture), its
purpose would still only authorizejurisdiction over these new violations
when necessary to avoid foreign conflicts.
The Kadic court felt that its reliance on Filartiga was both justified
and mandated by precedent. In its denial of defendant's petition for
rehearing, the court stated that "[w]e have neither the authority nor
the inclination to retreat from ... [Filartiga's] ruling." 2  In relying
on Filartiga's assertion of worldwidejurisdiction, the Second Circuit was
securely in step with the recent pronoucements of all three branches
of government and judicial thought.2 Both Congress and the
Executive have consistently adhered to Filartiga 's jurisdictional scope.
In 1992, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA) .22' The TVPA legislative history provides the most conclusive
evidence that Congress intended for federal courts to use § 1350 to
remedy certain law of nations violations no matter where they occur.
The legislative history states that the clarification was necessary in light
217 See id. (stating that "[t]he focus of attention, then, was on actions occurring within
the territory of the United States, or perpetrated by a U.S. citizen, against an alien.").
218 See id. at 812 (Bork, J., concurring).
219 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 821 (Bork, J., concurring).
220 Smith, supra note 213, at 449-50.
221 Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996).
222 See, e.g., supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
223 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Note (Supp. V. 1992).
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of Judge's Bork's controversial concurrence in Tel-Oren.224
The Executive Branch also supported the plaintiffs' claims in both
Filartiga and Kadic, urging for an expansive reading of § 1350.225
Since worldwidejurisdiction necessarily implicates foreign affairs where
Congress and the President are the primary actors, support from the
Executive branch alleviates many Constitutional concerns about the
role of the courts in foreign affairs. With the support of the
Executive, the Kadic court did not have to assume the risk that its
decision might result in multiple or contradictory pronouncements
with regard to United States foreign policy. 26
It is the Kadic court's blind reliance on Filartiga that is more
troubling. The Kadic court ignored the rather compelling dicta in the
well-researched concurrences of the Tel-Oren judges.22 7 In Tel-Oren,
both Judge Edwards and Judge Bork delved deep into the historical
quagmire surrounding § 1350 and stressed its essential use as a device
to quash potential foreign relations conflicts.2 Judge Edwards even
derived an alternative formulation of Filartiga which he felt more
adequately addressed and met the historical intent of the statute,229
while Judge Bork's opinion noted that cases like Filartiga actually
thwart the original purpose of the statute. ° Judge Bork specifically
calls attention to the Framers' well-publicized fear of unwanted foreign
entanglements and contends that an assertion of jurisdiction in cases
like Filartiga will actually serve to realize those fears.231 In light of the
compelling historical evidence surrounding the origins of the Alien
Tort Act set forth by both Judge Edwards and Judge Bork, 2 it may
be more appropriate for Congress to debate the propriety of such
jurisdiciton in the context of today's vastly different geopolitical
landscape before courts continue to expand on decisions like Filartiga
2. Prudential Concerns with Worldwide Jurisdiction
Besides the historical evidence suggesting that § 1350 might not
authorize worldwide jurisdiction into the affairs and activities of foreign
countries, there are more important prudential concerns when
224 Id.; See also, H.R. REP. No. 367, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.CAN. 84, 84-87 (reflecting legislative history).
225 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 n.24 (2d Cir. 1980); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40
(2d Cir. 1995).
226 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
227 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985).
228 Id. at 782-91 (Edwards, J. concurring); id. at 812-816, 821-822 (Bork, J., concurring).
229 Id. at 786-91 (Edwards, J., concurring). Most importantly, Judge Edwards admits in
note 18 that he had "some misgivings about the propriety of § 1350 actions between two
aliens" under the Filartiga formulation. Id. at 786 n.18 (Edwards, J., concurring).
230 Id. at 813 (Bork, J., concurring).
231 Id. at 811-20 (Bork, J., concurring).
232 See supra note 228; see also supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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domestic courts exercise such jurisdiction. Even if jurisdiction is
clearly authorized by Congress, it could produce logistical nightmares
which could ultimately threaten the integrity of the federal courts. The
Kadic court recognized that adjudicating its dispute may have an
immediate impact on U.S. foreign affairs in Bosnia, especially
regarding the defendant, Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.23 3 The
court acknoweldged that the case might present a political question,
but after further analysis, concluded that it did not.2 4  The court
noted that even the Executive Branch had suggested to the court that
"although there might be instances in which federal courts are asked
to issue rulings under the Alien Tort [Act] or [TVPA] that might raise
political question, this is not one of them."
2 15
The Kadic court, however, did not address some of the more basic
procedural problems with worldwide jurisdiction that might occur
when a United States court's jurisdiction expands worldwide. Some of
these concerns were perhaps best expressed by Judge Robb in his brief
but telling Tel-Oren concurrence.23 6 Judge Robb was troubled by the
complicated, if not impossible process of compelling the parties to
attend, engaging them in a meaningful and successful hearing, and
then the additional difficulty in sorting out individual responsibility
within the highly-sensitive and politically-charged network of interna-
tional crime. 37 Performing such tasks may out of reach for the
federal judiciary. As Judge Robb reminds us,
It is one thing for a student note-writer to urge that the courts accept the
challenges involved. It is an entirely different matter for a court to be
asked to conduct such a hearing successfully. The dangers are obvious.
To grant the initial access in the face of an overwhelming probability of
frustration of the trial process as we know it is an unwise step.25
233 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 248-50 (2d Cir. 1995).
234 Id. The court analyzed the applicability of the political question doctine under the
factors set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The court concluded that since there
was no real threat of the court's decision contradicting any prior decisions espoused by the
other branches of government and since Filaitiga had established judicial norms for proper
adjudication of the dispute, the political question doctrine did not bar the court from
hearing the case. Id.
235 Id. at 250 (citing Statement of Interest of the United States at 3).
236 Tel-Oren v. Libyan-Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1003) (Robb, J., concurring).
237 Id. (Robb, J., concurring).
238 Id. at 823-24. (RobbJ., concurring) (citation omitted). The Kadic case exemplifies
another procedural problem that may effect the integrity of the federal courts: service of
process. In order to effectively serve process, the foreign defendants must come to the
United States without the protection of certain available immunities. In this unlikely event,
the court must then locate and properly serve the defendant. Though the court was able to
serve the defendant Karadzic, such an event is a fortuitous anomaly. The string of
contingencies that must occur in this scenario make it improbable that federal courts will ever
properly assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Further, the types of
defendants who commit these acts are often those who lurk in the international under-
ground. As Judge Robb notes, the complexities and raw danger inherent in such a search
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Even when a defendant is properly served, tried and a judgment
entered against him, there is the additional problem of under-enforce-
ment. To this day, Dolly and Joel Filartiga have not received a cent of
their judgment against Pena.239 Thus, while the case provides impor-
tant insight into judicial doctrine and has been the subject of several
scholastic articles, it has little practical value. Even if the district court
executes a judgment against Karadzic, it is unlikely that he will avail
himself to U.S. officials so that they may enforce it.
V. Conclusion
The Second Circuit made it clear that while torturers may escape
liability in United States courts by posing as private, "non-state actors,"
genocidists and war criminals may not.2" On its face, the Kadic case
represents a significant breakthrough in establishing broader standards
of liability for private individual conduct and should be championed
by international human rights advocates. The more practical rule in
the case, however, was that rebel or insurrectionist regimes such as
Srpska can be classified as state actors within international law and thus
will be more susceptible to liability for violating international law.24" '
The more liberal definition of state status under international law as
defined by the Restatement and U.S. courts will make it much easier
to hold such leaders accountable for their actions in the future.242
The most important aspect of the Kadic case not fully addressed
by the court involves the power of § 1350 to grant federal courts such
expansive and intrusive jurisdiction into the affairs of foreign states.
The applicability of the Alien Tort Act to pursue law of nations
violations committed by aliens in their own countries was not a goal of
the Framers in 1789 when the first Alien Tort provision was passed.243
Most courts have at least recognized that a chief goal of the Framers
was to use alienage jurisdiction to promote and ensure peaceful
relations with foreign nations rather than to provoke potential
conflicts.2" Using §1350 to adjudicate law of nations violations which
occur outside the United States and do not implicate U.S. citizens or
foreign policy runs the risk of provoking conflict with the foreign state.
It seems clear that this use of § 1350 would be clearly against the
may be way beyond the reach or desires of the federal courts. Id.
239 SUNGA, supra note 153, at 113 (indicating Pena-Irala simply returned to Paraguay
where he was beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement).
240 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-43 (2d Cir. 1995).
241 Supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 20304 and accompanying text.
243 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808-20 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork,
J., concurring).
244 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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Framers' original goals. If such an admittedly narrow and historical
reading of the Alien Tort Act renders it practically useless for foreign
plaintiffs seeking redress from human rights violations committed
against them in their own countries, 245 then Congress should pass an
updated statute that addresses the propriety of handling these
politically sensitive cases which have the potential for creating
potentially explosive foreign relations problems.
Congress may very well intend for the courts to provide a forum
for aliens to obtain relief from the monstrous and murderous law of
nations offenses such as war crimes, genocide and torture, even when
they involve foreign citizens in foreign countries. 246 Thorough
legislative debate is needed on this issue, however, and the federal
courts should not continue to utilize the antiquated Alien Tort Act to
bypass the need for a clear legislative pronouncement. Instead of
manipulating the bare language of the ancient text of § 1350, the
federal courts should encourage Congress to amend § 1350 to provide
explicit authorization to adjudicate such claims.
Even if Acts of Congress authorize federal courts to exercise
worldwide jurisdiction over certain acts committed in violation of the
law of nations, there still exists a host of commentators who feel that
such jurisdiction is not in the best interest of either U.S. foreign policy
or the international community at large. 4  The logistical complica-
tions in these cases will ultimately challenge the integrity of U.S.
courts. Problems with personal jurisdiction, while not present in the
245 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774 (Edwards,J, concurring). Judge Edwards claimed thatJudge
Bork's narrow interpretaion of the statute would render it virtually a dead letter for
addressing any violations of the law of nations. Id. This position is extreme since there have
been several situations recently where § 1350 could be applied prerfectly true to its original
intent. The rash of violence perpetratd in Florida against foreign tourists continues to
outrage the international community, particularly the home state of the victims. Certainly,
they would expect their citizens to get civil relief in U.S. courts if they so desired, since the
attacks were committed by American citizens in Florida. Alienage jurisdiciton in this case
would serve the Framers' desire to quell any potential dispute that would arise if American
courts were powerless to hear such cases. Compare this scenario with one where a German
tourist was tortured by a French citizen in France. Clearly, U.S. jurisdiciton would take on
an entirely new characteristic. It would be more intrusive than defensive because U.S. foreign
relations are simply not implicated in the second case.
246 See Torture Victim and Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Note 1994).
247 See, e.g., Farooq Hassan, A Conflict of Philosophies: The Filartiga Jurisprudence, 32 INT'L
& CoMP. L. Q. 250, 256-58 (1983). Hassan recognized problems with domestic courts trying
to enforce international norms, especially when they involve acts committed in foreign
nations. He argued that "[t]here is something to be said against the emergence of ajurispru-
dence which allows the domestic courts of one country to try, in actions for civil wrong, the
citizens of another country for violations of international law." Id. at 256. See also, Castro,
supra note 1, at 484. Castro maintains that "[i]f the United States is going to to regulate the
activities of citizens of foreign countries in their own countries.., the plan of the Constitu-
tion surely counsels restraint." Id. In his conclusion Smith suggests that Filartiga type cases
"might generate tension between the United States and foreign nations." E. Hardy Smith,
supra note 213 at 450; see also SUNGA, supra note 153 at 111-13.
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Kadic case, 248 will thwart the power of most federal courts which try
and hear these cases in the future. The authority of U.S. courts will
be further undermined if they undertake the tremendous task of
bringing noted terrorists or ruthless dictators to judgment and fail to
effectuate any meaningful outcome.
Thus, while cases like Filartiga provide fodder for law review
analysis,249 the practical value of these cases is minimal. In fact, their
real value may be in convincing federal courts that even if worldwide
jurisdiction may be authorized in some cases, it is ill-advised in
most.
2 50
As President Bush wrote when he signed the TVPA in 1992, "there
is too much litigation at present even by Americans against Americans.
The expansion of litigation by aliens against aliens is a matter that
must be approached with prudence and restraint."2 51  Maintaining
the integrity of the federal courts, both at home and abroad, may be
more worthwhile than chasing evasive defendants or empty judgments.
CHARLES E MARSHALL
248 See supra note 28.
249 See supra note 247; Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1.
250 Civil judgments are nearly impossible to collect once the defendant returns to his
home state. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
251 4 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 91 (102d Cong.) (Statement by President of
the United States) (1992).
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